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Introduction
The collective individual households or coin economic theory aims to study how savings have been 
and are being allocated to the various asset classes and how they are being used.
The main conclusion from this study is that some savings can be held in the financial sector and 
stay there while other savings are transferred to the real or business sector in order to increase 
output  and create  employment.  An analysis  of the Balance Sheet  of Households  and Nonprofit 
Organizations as produced on a quarterly and annual basis by the Federal Reserve Bank in the U.S. 
helps to underpin this theory. For instance the net financial assets of individual households in 1985 
were 1.93 the nominal GDP level in that year. In 2013 as per end of June it had reached the level of 
2.90 times the forecasted GDP for 2013.
The main reasons are that financial assets allocated to share equities do not represent the volume 
amounts of savings transferred to the company sector. Greed and fear may influence the financial 
assets  allocated  to  shares  rather  than  expected  future  profits.  The  second  reason  is  that  U.S. 
government debt is a type of consumer debt; once used it rapidly loses its GDP value. Government 
debt also does not create a cash flow, like the company sector does. Savings can only be allocated 
once and if they stay in the financial sector, they do not help the business sector to develop.
The 1929 Great Depression started off with a boom-bust stock market, followed by a run on the 
banks. So, on a smaller scale did the dot.com bubble burst in 2000-2001.The current financial crisis 
was  a  home  mortgage  crisis,  which  not  only  affected  property  prices,  but  also  the  collective 
individual households income earnings and allocation of incomes. Over the period 2008-2012 5.4 
million households lost their homes through repossession or 1 in 10 households with a mortgage. 
More than 20 million households or 1 in 6 households were involved in foreclosure proceedings 
during the same period.
The  collective  individual  households  changed  their  spending  habits  from 2008  onwards.  They 
repaid $1.15 trillion of the national home mortgage portfolio and funded the construction of over 4 
million new homes out of incomes and savings. Of course, the demand for goods and services 
dropped with all  the unemployment  and income effects,  the latter  increasing  at  below inflation 
levels.
The U.S. government’s reaction was funding an accumulated deficit of $ 7 trillion since 2008; on 
top  of  this  the  Federal  Reserve  spent  another  $2  trillion  on  buying  up  government  and  other 
securities. This amounts to $57,000 per individual household.
The main reason that the use of these funds has been so ineffective is that it did not address the core  
cause  of  the  fall  in  demand:  the  wish  and  the  need  by individual  households  to  restore  their 
individual balance sheet.
The coin economic theory may help to show that financial sector (equals savings) growth does not 
equate to GDP growth. In this  article  the theory explores the allocation of savings, the role of 
interest rates, the causes of financial crises, the savers and borrowers’ philosophies, the difference 
between financial sector companies as savings distributors and real businesses as users of savings 
for production purposes and the possible correction mechanisms including economic easing. The 
latter method implies no additional borrowings for individual households but a temporary transfer 
from their own financial assets to the income side of individual households.
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1 A brief summary of the historical development of economic theories.
The founder of the study of economics was Adam Smith. In 1776 he published his book: “The 
Wealth of Nations”. In this book Adam Smith came to the conclusion, based on many business 
observations, that individual households acting collectively,  but equally acting in their own self-
interest, do manage to produce and purchase the goods and services that they as a society require. 
Adam Smith calls this mechanism of combined collective and individual households’ actions: the 
“invisible hand”. Adam Smith used a number of practical experiences to illustrate this mechanism, 
but as the hand is “invisible” it cannot be proven to exist. Smith theory is referred to as classical 
economics. Its key doctrine is the “laissez faire” attitude by government towards the marketplace. 
This will, according to classical and neo-classical economists, allow the invisible hand to generate 
economic growth.
In 1803 J.B. Say reformulated Adam Smith’s doctrine.
In Say's language, "products are paid for with products" or "a glut can take place only when there 
are too many means of production applied to one kind of product and not enough to another" or "the 
supply creates its own demand" Explaining his point at length, he wrote that:
It is worthwhile to remark that a product is no sooner created than it, from that instant, affords a 
market  for  other  products  to  the  full  extent  of  its  own value.  When the  producer  has  put  the 
finishing  hand  to  his  product,  he  is  most  anxious  to  sell  it  immediately,  lest  its  value  should 
diminish in his hands. Nor is he less anxious to dispose of the money he may get for it; for the value 
of money is also perishable. But the only way of getting rid of money is in the purchase of some 
product or other. Thus the mere circumstance of creation of one product immediately opens a vent 
for other products.
He also wrote, that it is not the abundance of money but the abundance of other products in general 
that facilitates sales.
Money performs but a momentary function in this double exchange; and when the transaction is 
finally closed, it will always be found, that one kind of commodity has been exchanged for another.
The  Scottish  economist  James  Mill  restated  Say's  law  in  1808,  writing  that  "production  of 
commodities creates, and is the one and universal cause which creates a market for the commodities 
produced.
Say himself never used many of the later short definitions of Say's law and thus Say's law actually 
developed due to the work of many of his contemporaries and those who came after him. The work 
of  James  Mill,  David  Ricardo,  John  Stuart  Mill,  and  others  evolved  Say's  law  into  what  is 
sometimes called "law of markets" which was the framework of macroeconomics from the mid-
19th century until the 1930s.
Alfred Marshall was the dominant figure in British economics (itself dominant in world economics) 
from about 1890 until his death in 1924. His specialty was micro-economics -the study of individual 
markets  and industries,  as opposed to the study of the whole economy-.  In his  most  important 
book:” Principals of Economics”,  Marshall  emphasized that the price and output of a good are 
determined by both supply and demand:  the two curves are like scissor blades that intersect  at 
equilibrium. Modern economists, trying to understand why the price of a good change, still start by 
looking for factors that may have shifted demand or supply, an approach they owes to Marshall.
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Another influential economist was Karl Marx. Adam Smith saw harmony and growth, Marx saw 
instability,  struggle  and  decline.  His  vision  was  that  the  capitalist  exploits  labourers,  not 
withstanding that according to Marx all value is created by the labourers. Capitalists undervalue 
labourers  to  create  their  own  profits.  Marx  could  not  accept  the  concept  of  a  profit  oriented 
organisation. Marx predicted the fall of capitalism as he foresaw society moving to a two class 
system of a few wealthy capitalists and a mass of underpaid under privileged workers.
The  socialist  centrally  planned  economies  have  proven  to  be  less  efficient  in  producing  and 
delivering goods and services than capitalist  systems.  Secondly workers’ incomes have actually 
risen over time, which defuses the theory that labour is exploited in the name of profits. If workers’ 
incomes are rising, they are clearly sharing in the growth in an economy.
One of the greatest economists of all times was John Maynard Keynes. In 1936 he published his: 
“General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”. Previous to Keynes, mainstream economic 
thought  was  that  the  economy  existed  in  the  state  of  general  equilibrium.  The  underlying 
assumption of the classical economists was that if a surplus of goods and services exists, they would 
naturally drop in price to the point where they would be consumed.
Keynes argued that because there was no guarantee that the goods individuals produce would be 
met  with  demand,  unemployment  was  a  natural  consequence.  Keynes  advocated  using  under-
utilised savings through increased government spending. His analysis was based on the premise that 
if companies collectively did not invest enough savings in goods and services, this could lead to an 
economy operating below its potential  output and growth rate. Additional  government  spending 
could be used to increase aggregate demand to increase economic activity, reduce unemployment 
and avoid deflation. Keynes argued that the solution to the Great Depression was to stimulate the 
economy through some combination of two approaches:
- A reduction in interest rates (monetary policy), and
- Government investment in infrastructure (fiscal policy).
By reducing the interest  rate  at  which the central  bank lends  money to commercial  banks,  the 
government sends a signal to commercial banks that they should do the same to their customers.  
The infrastructure projects could be funded from additional government borrowings through issuing 
government bonds. This action involves creating a fiscal deficit. Keynes concluded that, in some 
situations, no strong automatic mechanism moves output and employment towards full employment 
levels. His view differs from the neo-classical economists who see price adjustments to create the 
general equilibrium.
Keynes views on wages were more complex. He argued that it is not real but nominal wages that 
are the result of negotiations between employers and workers. Secondly nominal wage cuts would 
be difficult to put into effect because of laws and collective labour agreements. Keynes rejected 
wage cuts as he did not see such action cure recessions, rather the opposite.
To  Keynes,  excessive  saving,  i.e.  saving  beyond  planned  investment,  was  a  serious  problem, 
encouraging  recession  or  even  depression.  He  did  not  agree  with  the  laissez-faire  attitude  of 
classical economists. His conclusion was that savings do not fall much as interest rates fall, since 
the  income  and  substitution  effects  of  falling  rates  go  in  conflicting  directions.  Second,  since 
planned fixed investment  in plant and equipment  is based mostly on long term expectations  of 
future profitability, spending does not raise much as interest rates fall. Third, Keynes argued that 
5
saving and investment are not the main determinant of interest rates, especially in the short run. 
Instead, the supply and demand for the stock of money determine the interest rates in the short run. 
Neither  changes  quickly in  response to excessive saving to allow fast  interest-rate  adjustments. 
Keynes also noted that the pile-up of unsold goods and materials encourages business to decrease 
production and employment. This in turn lowers people’s incomes - and savings. For Keynes, the 
fall  in income did most of the job by ending excessive saving and allowing the loanable funds 
market to retain equilibrium. Instead of interest-rate adjustment solving the problem, a recession 
does so. For Keynes rather than prices adjusting to attain equilibrium, the main message is one of 
quantity adjustment.
2. Changes in saving patterns
2.1 Savings by individual households
In the United States the Federal Reserve Bank has long published1 quarterly and annual overviews 
of  the  assets  and  liabilities  of  the  collective  of  individual  households:  the  Balance  Sheet  of 
Households and Nonprofit Organizations. These statistics show that the financial assets grew from 
$10.7 trillion in 1985 till $61.8 trillion as per 30 June 2013. The liabilities grew from $2.37 trillion 
in 1985 till $13.55 trillion also per end of June 2013. The financial assets minus liabilities grew 
over the same period from $8.33 trillion till $48.25 trillion. The ratio: net financial assets to nominal 
GDP, was 1.93 as per the end of 1985 and rose to 2.90 as per the end of the second quarter of 2013.  
This trend line movement is of great importance as will be explained in section 3. 
There is another method of measuring the growing importance of the financial sector over the real 
sector.  In  2012 in  the  U.S.,  personal  income was running at  $13.75 trillion.  The net  worth  of 
individual households was $64.185 trillion in the same year, which means that savings represented 
more than 4.5 years  of personal income in the U.S. If one deducts the net worth of individual 
households invested in homes and consumer durable goods of respectively $8.26 trillion for homes 
and  $2.12  trillion  for  durable  consumer  goods,  than  the  value  of  the  financial  assets  of  U.S. 
individual households was $53.8 trillion. This implies that the financial assets were just under 4 
times  the  personal  income level  in  2012.  The  financial  savings  were  around  80% of  financial 
savings plus personal incomes, the latter only representing the 20% category.
2.2 Categories of savings by individual households
Of the $61.8 trillion in financial assets individual households have accumulated as per 30 th June 
2013, $9.0 trillion was invested in deposits made up from foreign deposits, checkable deposits and 
currency,  time and savings deposits  and money market fund shares. A further $5.5 trillion was 
invested in capital market instruments, consisting mainly of treasury securities, municipal securities 
and corporate and foreign bonds. Other financial assets held were: corporate equities $11.5 trillion, 
mutual fund shares $5.9 trillion,  life insurance reserves $1.2 trillion,  pension entitlements $18.8 




2.3 Relative growth of some individual savings categories.
The following table indicates the relative position of each major savings category in the years 1985, 
1995, 2005 and 2013, the latter the situation as per 30th June.
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Foreign bonds         0.01%     2.71%    2.91%   3.99%
Corporate
Equities        11.4%    19.51%   17.58%   18.53%
Mutual Fund
Shares          2.0%      5.51%     7.82%     9.48%
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Non-Corporate





       
       26.48%
         2.45%     
    29.55%
     2.49%
   28.54%
     2.33%
    30.29%
      1.94%
One can draw a few conclusions from the above table:
• Deposits dropped in importance in the period 1985-1995, but have been relatively stable 
since then,
• Treasury and Municipal Securities showed a dip in 2005, but were back to the level of 1995 
as per the latest statistics
• Corporate and foreign bonds showed a very substantial growth over the period 1985-2013
• Corporate  equities  grew strongly in  the  period  1985-1995,  but  their  relative  importance 
tapered off after that period 
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• Equity in Non-Corporate Business showed the greatest volatility, but ultimately the greatest 
decline over the period 1985-2013
• Mutual funds shares showed the highest rate of growth of all savings categories over the last 
18 years
• Pension fund savings constitute the lions’ share of individual households’ savings and these 
pension funds managed to grow faster than the total volume of savings
• On the other hand savings through life insurance companies declined over the last eight 
years.
In countries, other than the United States, the lack of comparable data makes observations about the 
development  of  their  individual  households’  saving levels  more  difficult.  However  as  financial 
markets in the major countries seem to show a great level of interdependence, there may be some 
similarities between the U.S. case and the case of other countries.
3 The Collective Individual Households or Coin economic theory
3.1 Introduction
During Adam Smith’s  period  the  importance  of  financial  savings  was  negligible.  If  individual 
households had savings, such savings were invested in land and buildings rather than in financial 
instruments. Therefore his focus on the real sector was logical. He was the first economist to draw 
attention to individual households acting collectively but also in their own self interest.
Keynes, against the background of the Great Depression period, saw that economies did not have a 
natural tendency to go back to equilibrium. The price mechanism did not lead to such equilibrium. 
The stock market crash of 1929 was the first time that the financial sector forced the real economy 
into a decline. The time line of the Great Depression2 showed that what started on October 24th 1929 
led to losses to savings of over $30 billion, which was about 40% of stock market values and 10 
times the U.S. government budget for 1929. Brokers had lent funds to individual households to 
acquire stocks and of course in the declining stock market environment, they wanted their loans 
back. What made matters worth is that individual households en masse withdrew funds from the 
banking sector as they no longer trusted their banks as there was no deposit guarantee scheme in 
place.  On  top  of  this  the  Federal  Reserve  increased  interest  rates,  which  made  it  harder  for 
companies  to produce output and make profits.  The subsequent  effect  was high unemployment 
levels, which lasted till the Second World War.
3.2 The tenets of the Coin economic theory
For any new economic theory to make sense, it has to show how it differs from existing theories 
and what type of evidence there is to support its tenets.
The Coin theory is based on the above mentioned observation that the net financial assets in the 
U.S. are currently 2.9 times its GDP as compared to 1.93 in 1985. The net financial savings were 
nearly 4 times personal income levels in 2012 as compared to 3.26 times in 1990. In 2012 the  
savings-income  distribution  was  80%  savings  and  20%  personal  income.  This  dramatic  shift 
towards  savings  did  not  exist  at  the  times  of  Keynes,  let  alone  Adam Smith.  There  are  many 
implications of this shift and they will be discussed in the following sections.
2 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/timeline/rails-timeline/
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The first tenet is linked to the change in the distribution between savings and incomes and between 
savings and GDP levels
The second tenet is linked to the use of savings. There are three main user groups of savings in an 
economy: the collective of individual households; a government and the business (or real) sector.
The third tenet is that each user group has a different savings and borrowings philosophy.
The fourth tenet is that the collective borrowings of individual households or governments on their 
behalf  may  cause  the  recession  periods.  One  should  stress  that  the  lenders  carry  the  full 
responsibility for their lending decisions.
The fifth tenet is that the 2008 financial crisis was caused by excessive lending growth in home 
mortgages, excessive as compared to the income growth of individual households.
The sixth tenet is that interest rates are not the predominant factor for individual households to 
decide on their various savings decisions.
The seventh tenet is that the funding of government debt is best achieved by raising market funds 
on an index-linked basis.
The eighth tenet is that correction of the financial crisis should be aimed at the income side of the 
balance sheet of individual households, rather than be done in an indirect manner as a public works 
programme or through quantitative easing.
The ninth tenet is that the financial sector works under very different costs-benefit structures than 
the real sector. Laissez-faire policies should not apply to the financial sector.
In each of the following eight sections each of the tenets will be tested.
3.2.1 Savings and the GDP level and savings and the collective individual households’ income 
level (first tenet)
The financial assets allocation and the changes therein over the years 1985 -2013 show that assets 
do not only show a volume change, but equally a price change. This may be a somewhat confusing 
statement as all monies in the U.S. are expressed in U.S. dollars. One has to look into the individual 
asset allocation categories to investigate how volume and price can be separated. The first category 
is corporate equities. The money allocated out of savings into this category does not represent the 
monies that listed companies have received to invest in company assets. If this transfer of financial  
assets to companies in the real sector is called the volume transfer, than the remainder of the savings 
which stay behind in the financial sector can be called the price factor. Even listed companies can 
undo the volume factor by holding substantial cash reserves, which add to the price factor. They 
also undo the volume factor by returning dividends to the accumulated financial savings.
The current level of individual households’ financial assets to GDP ratio of 2.9 as per end of June 
2013 as compared to 1.93 in 1985 shows that over the period 1985-2013 the financial sector has 
absorbed additional savings of $16.2 trillion.  This figure is based on an expected nominal GDP 
level for 2013 of $16.7 trillion. The $16.2 trillion figure represents the price factor over the years 
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1985-2013. It is the amount of savings over the period 1985-2013, which has stayed within the 
financial sector and has not been converted into real sector activities.
One business sector, which turns nearly all of the available cash into output and jobs, is the non-
corporate business sector: the self employed and the small and medium sized companies of say with 
less than 1000 employees. If one looks at the decline in the relative position of the equity in non-
corporate business compared to the total financial assets accumulated by the collective of individual 
households,  warning bells  should have started ringing.  Non-corporate  businesses are  the family 
owned businesses, which grow their businesses from retained earnings. If one takes the data of 2008 
from the U.S. National Census Bureau3 than the total number of self employed and the businesses 
employing less than 1000 employees represented 87.6 million out of the total number employed of 
142.6 million in 2008. For job creation and income generation for individual households, 61.5% of 
all jobs depend on companies which nearly all have no access to the equity capital markets in the 
U.S. These companies rely primarily on internal savings accumulation for their  output and jobs 
growth levels.
Another  factor  which influences  the accumulated  amounts  of savings  held by the collective  of 
individual households is the amount of accumulated government debt. Keynes was right in pointing 
out that additional government spending over tax receipts improves the level of economic activity in 
a particular year. However the debt needs to be financed in the subsequent years, until it has been 
repaid.  Government  spending  is  rarely  directed  at  creating  future  cash  flows  out  of  current 
expenditure in ways that companies use. The implication of this is that savings which could have 
been used for building up assets in the real sector businesses have been reallocated to fund the 
accumulated government deficit funding. The implication is also that in future years the collective 
of individual households will  have to allocate a growing percentage of their  earned incomes to 
service interest and redemption costs of government debt.
The  two  major  factors  contributing  to  the  growth  of  the  financial  asset  base  of  individual 
households, without making a direct contribution to economic growth, are the amounts accumulated 
through share price movements and through a government’s debt accumulation. The third factor, 
which improves the net worth of individual households, is increasing house prices. However, when 
such price increases are based on increased borrowing levels at a speed far above income growth 
figures than the subsequent effect may be a recession.
The conclusion out of the above is that price changes: i.e. the amounts of monies left in the financial 
sector,  limit  the  volume changes  which  represent  the  monies  transferred  to  the  real  sector  for 
creating output and jobs. This has to be seen against the background that currently savings represent 
eighty percent of the savings plus income levels of the collective of individual households. 
3.2.2 The use and the users of savings (second tenet)
The 1929 crash happened initially as a consequence of stockbrokers providing margin call loans to 
individual households. The use of savings was to speculate on the outcome of something similar to 
a “black tulip mania”, which happened in Holland in the 17th century. Tulip prices rose to levels ten 
times the annual income of a skilled worker. Funding higher and higher share prices breaks the link 
between future earnings of a company and its stock market value. Prof. Shiller, the most recent 
economist to receive the Nobel Prize for economics, has developed the Shiller PE/10 measurement 
method to measure the so called: Irrational Exuberance in the stock markets. Irrational because at 
3 http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html
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different times the market sentiment may be guided by greed or fear, neither of which leads to 
sound valuations of future profit levels of the company sector.
Table 1 gave an overview of the financial asset allocation over the various asset classes and their 
relative growth rate as compared to the total increase in the savings volume. There are clearly some 
winners and losers in the asset allocation process. In the next sections a more in-depth treatment of 
each asset category will be discussed, but in this section the various user groups will be set out. The 
most  important  user group is not the company sector nor the government,  but the collective of 
individual households.
Individual households are collectively the owners of all financial assets in a country. They own the 
deposit  base, either directly or through their  shareholding in companies or their  participation in 
mutual funds and pension funds. They own the government, state and municipal debt in as far as it  
has  been  financed  domestically,  again  directly  or  indirectly.  In  the  latter  case  they  are  also 
responsible for paying back such debts in future years, whether or not it was financed from abroad. 
Individual households, again directly or indirectly, own all the corporate equities, again apart from 
the  shares  owned by foreign  individuals  or  entities.  They own the  mutual  fund shares  and all  
pension fund monies and the equity of non corporate business. Of course, not all households have 
an equal stake in the total financial asset base, but mutual funds and pension funds’ savings have 
very much widened the group of haves over the have-nots.
The second institution which uses savings is a government. In the U.S. and in many other countries 
the debt clock keeps ticking, to an extent that outstanding government debt in quite a few countries 
has grown to 100% or more than the annual GDP level. The U.S., Japan, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, 
Iceland and Greece are in this position.  Countries which have a level of over 80% are the U.K., 
Germany, France, Spain, Belgium and Canada. The character of government debt is quite similar to 
a  consumer’s  debt.  Money has  been borrowed and spent  to maintain  an excess  of  government 
expenditure over government revenues. The country figures are based on IMF data. The obligations 
to repay such debt, even if such debt has been funded from abroad, remains the obligation of the 
individual  households in future years.  It  reflects  the “price” to be paid out of incomes for past 
government expenditure, which was not funded by tax revenues at the time.
The third type of institutions which use savings is the company sector. They may be companies 
which have their shares listed on the stock exchanges, or those which are owned by individuals and 
families.  Companies  are  substantial  users  of  savings  as  all  their  funding  is  provided  by  the 
collective of individual households. In the Coin economic theory, financial sector intermediaries are 
excluded from this category as their line of business is the allocation of financial assets rather than 
the use of such assets for output creation purposes.
3.2.3 User groups and their savings and borrowings philosophy (third tenet)
The collective asset allocation of individual households is strongly influenced by the fact that most 
households have neither the skills nor the inclination to spend their daily hours to manage their own 
financial assets. As per 30th June 2013, from the total financial asset base of the collective U.S. 
individual households’, just over 60% or $37.25 trillion has been invested in corporate equities, 
mutual  fund shares,  pension  funds  and  life  insurance  reserves.  Generally  speaking  the  task  of 
managing these and other financial assets has been transferred to financial sector companies: banks, 
asset management companies, stockbrokers, mutual fund managers, hedge funds and life insurance 
11
companies. This is a non-exhaustive list of all companies involved in financial asset management 
activities.
In a previous paper: “The world’s dream: economic growth revisited”4, I explained that financial 
sector companies are totally different from real sector companies.
In the real sector a price stands for the remuneration for a good or service delivered to the public. 
The price represents the value attached to a product or the compensation for a service delivered. 
Companies can deduct their costs from the sales price and the difference between revenues and 
costs constitutes the profit level per item and for all sold items together the income level of the 
company. Company management can subsequently decide whether it is worthwhile to expand or 
reduce production.  In the real sector price levels  are often referred to as the guiding hand and 
correctly so.
A price in the financial sector is a very different price from one in the real sector. In the financial  
sector a price: share price, bond price, interest rate, exchange rate especially in the latter cases a 
forward, future and options price does not represent the costs of production. The financial sector 
does not produce savings; those savings are owned by the general public. The only item which the 
financial  sector really produces is: Considered Opinions (CO’s). These opinions are judgements 
about the rate of return on funds borrowed from the public, whether it is on home mortgage loans,  
on loans to companies or to a government, or on the future developments of share, bonds, exchange 
rates and commodity prices. If the predictions of the financial sector managers in foreseeing how 
such prices will develop do not materialise, the results will not appear in their own profit and loss 
accounts, but in the changes in the individual households’ net worth levels. It is slightly different 
with loans as loans stay mainly with the lending institutions. If loan losses are not foreseen, such 
loan losses will  find their  way into the balance sheets of banks and other financial  institutions. 
However as all funds that banks use are ultimately owned by the individual households, the losses 
are all borne by the latter households. Some bankers may lose their bonuses or even their jobs, but 
the value loss on savings ends up with the individual households.
Considered opinions are provided about expected future developments. The price set for a financial 
product  reflects  an  opinion  about  the  risks  to  be  incurred  over  the  savings  provided  by  the 
individual households. Such prices could be right, but they could equally be totally wrong. The real 
“costs of production” will only show up in future years, which may be five, ten, thirty or even more 
years away. In the real sector the price in the markets is a price for an end product or service,  
reflecting the reward at the end of the production period. In the financial sector the reward is an 
uncertain future cash flow, which often stretches out over many years. Hence the price set cannot 
possibly reflect the “true costs” as such costs are simply unknown. Only in hindsight can such 
“costs” be assessed. The financial sector cannot and does not work with a “guiding hand”. However 
as the financial sector rules over 80% of individual households’ savings and incomes, perhaps the 
time has come for those, who consider financial sector institutions equal to real sector companies, to 
review their opinions.
Over the period 1985-2013 the collective of U.S. individual households have been conservative in 
their financial affairs as is evidenced from the growth in the financial asset base as compared to 
their income levels. Only on three occasions: the savings and loan crisis in 1990-1991, whereby 
specialist savings and loans mortgage banks lend excessively for real estate investment, which went 
sour; the dot.com bubble in share prices in 2000-2001 and the subprime mortgage bubble over the 
period 2005-2008 where individual households were enticed to enter into house price but also bond 
4 http://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/50190.html
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price  speculation.  During  all  other  times,  the  collective  of  individual  households  acted  very 
conservatively.  Over the period 1995-2005 the owners’ equity as a percentage of household real 
estate  was maintained at  around 59%. The major  change started in  2006 with a  drop of  3.2% 
reaching the bottom level of 39.5% in 2009. The latest level as per end of June 2013 is 49.8% and 
well on the way to the more conservative levels of the past.
In the financial asset category of deposits, the collective of individual households do no longer have 
to work out the risks of a bank failing as the deposit insurance guarantee (FDIC) equalizes all banks 
on deposits’  risks.  The maximum guaranteed  amounts  of  $250,000 per  person make that  most 
individual households are fully covered for bank risks.
As  to  the  other  financial  asset  classes  with  the  exception  of  equity  in  non-corporate  business, 
individual  households  generally  leave  the  asset  allocation  decisions  to  the  financial  sector 
companies.
Governments with some exceptions do not save. The exceptions are Norway, a number of Middle 
Eastern countries and China and Singapore. What is striking is how different governments make 
different  decisions  over  their  borrowing  interest  rates.  Some  governments,  including  the  U.S., 
Canada and the U.K. have small or larger part of the total debt financed by index-linked bonds. The 
Bank of England’s own pension fund has over 94% of its assets allocated to such bonds5. 
What seems amazing is that the U.S. government debt level can lead to very heated debates in the 
Houses of Congress, but that the allocation over index-linked debt and fixed rate debt and over the 
various maturities is left to the Bureau of the Public Debt, which is part of the U.S. Treasury. In the 
article: World’s dream: economic growth revisited, a proposal was set out not just for the U.S. but 
for other countries which have a relatively high level of government debt, to use index-linked bonds 
for a much larger share of national debt. The argument is that it can be proven to be much cheaper 
than fixed rate debt over longer periods and U.S. government debt cannot be repaid in anything less 
than say 70 years. Secondly it avoids the mark-to-markets write ups and downs in asset values as a 
consequence  of  changing  interest  rates.  Such  changes  in  asset  values  are  based  on  artificial 
accounting methods anyway as they are based on short  term liquidity rather than on long term 
holdings of the debt. As mentioned the final maturity of the total U.S. government debt level may 
well  be over 70 years,  so current  debt paper needs to  be replaced by new debt paper.  Thirdly 
quantitative easing has bought up U.S. government debt paper to an extent of well over $2 trillion. 
Individual households’ savings were not used for this purpose, neither foreign savings, but the Fed 
just printed the money. This led to a substantial lowering of interest rates while simultaneously the 
volume of government debt issued reached all time high levels. The reverse process will bring about 
substantial interest rate increases. Issuing a high level of index-linked government bonds will lower 
the losses to individual households and to the financial managers acting on their behalf; the losses 
will be lower than those that the existing fixed rate government bonds portfolio will encounter.
One does not have to spend many words on how companies finance themselves, apart that the drop 
in relative position for the equity in non-corporate business needs redressing as those businesses are 
vital for jobs and incomes for the collective of individual households.
5 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Documents/humanresources/pensionreport.pdf
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3.2.4 Asset allocation and recession periods (fourth and fifth tenets)
One simple assessment is that the allocation of a financial asset can only be done to one asset at the 
exclusion of all other financial assets. One dollar in savings cannot be used twice. This truth applies 
to assets allocated to fund the government debt levels, it also applies to funding excessive amounts 
to buy listed company shares on the stock markets and it applies to funding excessive price rises in 
home values. Any of these three allocations can cause recession periods. 
Financial  assets  are  different  from  company  assets  in  that  the  products  that  financial  sector 
managements offer make it possible to speculate  on many aspects of the financial  price setting 
without having to provide 100% funding for such actions. The derivatives markets make it possible 
to taken open positions on share and bond prices and on interest rates, exchange rates and a whole 
host of other financial sector prices. The margin calls are small as compared to the total financial 
gain  or  loss  which  can  be  made  from entering  into  such  contracts.  Banks  and  other  financial 
institutions make a substantial share of their earnings from trading and assisting in trading of the 
underlying financial assets as well as trading in derivatives.
In hindsight the 1929 recession was caused by the wrong allocation of savings, away from the real 
sector in order to speculate on share prices, followed by bank runs.
The dotcom bubble showed similar characteristics, but individual household’s incomes were not 
much affected, nor were there bank runs. The dot.com bubble did not last very long.
The 2008 financial crisis was much more serious.
Making money available  to individual  households,  especially  of the long term variety of home 
mortgages, requires a judgment on the future repayment capabilities of each individual household. 
There  are  three  aspects  to  such  lending:  the  first  one  is  that  the  judgment  represents  a  risk 
assessment. A risk assessment is different from a price in that the applied price includes the risk 
premium over costs of funds over a long period. Only future developments will show whether the 
accepted price was the correct one. The 2008 financial crisis showed that in many cases the price 
was wrong or even more importantly that based on the income levels of some borrowers no price 
would  have  ever  matched  their  ability  to  repay  their  home  loans.  For  some  5.4  million  U.S. 
borrowers, representing 10% of those having a mortgage,  there was no equilibrium price. Their 
homes  were repossessed.  40% of all  American households  having a mortgage were faced with 
foreclosure proceedings over the period 2004-2012.  
The second aspect is that the demand for homes is a finite one based on population growth and on 
the changes in the average household. 
The third aspect is that making money available for home mortgages can have two effects: the first 
one is that money enables families to acquire a home, but the second one is that if supply is not  
forthcoming in the short run in the places where families want to live, it drives up house prices. To 
lend money which is converted into increased house prices has less impact on economic growth 
than new construction; not only that, but one may question the economic value of rapid rises in 
house prices. The latter savings allocation resembles the greed and fear factor of share price rises, 
with  the  difference  that  borrowed  funds  need  to  be  repaid  out  of  the  collective  of  individual 
households’ incomes.
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3.2.4.1 The U.S. experience
Over  the  period  2000-2006  in  the  United  States  the  combined  mortgage  debt  of  individual 
households increased from $4.814 trillion as per the year-end 2000 till $9.874 trillion as per the end 
of  2006,  an  increase  of  105.1%. Over  the  same period  the  median  income level  of  individual  
households moved up in nominal terms from $41,186 in 2000 till $47,262 in 2006, an increase of 
14.75%. If one takes into account the increase in the number of individual households from 104.705 
million  in  the  year  2000 till  114.384 million  in  2006 than the  average  amount  of  outstanding 
mortgage debt moved up from $45,977 in 2000 till $86,323 in 2006; an increase of 87.75%. The 
conclusion can be drawn that mortgage debt expanded by a factor practically six times faster than 
median  income  levels.  This  excessive  speed  of  lending  for  home  buying  purposes  plus  the 
packaging of such home loans into daily tradable mortgage backed securities lies at the heart of the 
causes for the 2008 financial crisis.
- The national home mortgage portfolio
The amounts of $4.8 trillion in 2000 and $9.9 trillion in 2006 represent the national home mortgage 
portfolio of the U.S. in these years. The quality of the national home mortgage portfolio is strongly 
influenced  by  the  quality  of  the  borrowers.  The  graph  below  shows  the  rapid  growth  of  the 
subprime share in new mortgage originations in the years 2004-2006.
Table 2:  Sub prime mortgage originations6
6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisis
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In table 3 the annual outstanding mortgage amounts are provided over the period 1996-2008 as well 
as the annual increase in outstanding mortgage amounts. Also included in the table are the house 
price inflation levels on a year over year base and the consumer price inflation levels7 over same 
period. Finally the excess of house price inflation over CPI has been displayed.
Table 3: U.S.  Mortgages  outstanding 1996-2008,  annual increments in mortgage amounts, 
house price changes and consumer price inflation levels.










































































- Credit judgment errors.
When individual households get into payment difficulties on their home mortgages, the first action 
by the lenders is foreclosure, followed by a foreclosure filing and subsequently home repossessions. 
U.S. statistics on all three can be found on the website of Statistic Brain8. The credit  judgment 




were 90% higher than 2004 and in 2007 nearly 3.5 times the 640 000 level of 2004.The peak was 
reached in 2011 at 3,920,418 which stood at  over 6 times the 2004 level. All this led to home 
repossessions which numbered 269,000 in 2006, 489,000 in 2007, 679,000 in 2008, 945,000 in 
2009, 1,125,000 in 2010, 1,147,000 in 2011 and over 700,000 in 2012. All in all nearly 5.4 million 
credit judgement errors led to the ultimate repossession of homes. The number of households who 
had to deal  with foreclosure proceedings  amounted  to  21.4 million  households  over the period 
2004-2012. The Milken Institute9 estimated that in June 2008 there were 53 million households 
having a mortgage and 27 million were outright owners without any mortgage. Of the 53 million 
just over 40% had to deal with foreclosure proceedings during the 2004-2012 period; a staggering 
percentage, which really showed the extent of the financial crisis for individual households.
The  credit  judgment  errors  were  compounded  by the  securitization  process,  which,  as  table  2 
showed, really took off in 2003 when nearly two thirds of new home mortgage originations were 
farmed out to the financial markets. This meant that American financial institutions were able to 
generate mortgage sales, but did not need the financial reserves as the transactions were packaged 
and sold off to, among others, overseas banks and pension funds. It is noteworthy in this respect to 
note that the Bank of Spain, Spain’s central bank, did not allow Spanish banks to buy such U.S. 
mortgage backed bonds. Regretfully, it did not stop its own country’s real estate funding disaster. 
The  securitization  method  also  made  it  very  difficult  to  deal  with  individual  clients  as  whole 
portfolios  of  clients  were  simultaneously  declared  insolvent;  hence  the  enormous  numbers  of 
foreclosure procedures compared to the number of households having a mortgage. 
- Demand for homes
The key determinant in the demand for homes is not the price but the growth in the number of 
individual households. In the period 2000-2010 the number of households grew in the U.S. from 
105.5 million to 116.7 million according to the Census Bureau10.  On average the U.S. increased the 
number of individual households by 1.12 million per annum over the period 2000-2010. Of the 
around  80  million  homes  used  all  year  around  in  the  U.S.,  the  average  lifespan  can  only  be 
estimated but is probably around 130 years, which means that the total finite demand for homes is 
somewhere around 1.7 million  new housing starts per annum. Table 4 gives an overview of realised 
annual new housing starts, seasonally adjusted for the period 2000-2013






2000 1463 2007 1354
2001 1670 2008  923
2002 1655 2009  594
2003 1897 2010  546
2004 2002 2011  623
2005 2054 2012  741





Elements,  which “helped” individual  households to  acquire  homes,  were the applicable interest 
rates and other loan conditions attached to the mortgages. Low starts up interest rates were used to 
entice  individual  households  to  sign  up  to  mortgages.  Such  mortgages  had  their  rates  steeply 
increased after a two year period. 100% mortgages were also used with no repayment obligations. 
In many cases short term funding rates were applied rather than a 30 year fixed rate. All these 
elements shifted the credit risks to the individual households. The latter only hoped that house price 
increases and incomes would grow faster than their payment obligations. When the lending excess 
came to the boil in 2008, such hopes were shattered and not only did house prices drop rapidly, also 
income  growth  stayed  behind  CPI  inflation  levels  and,  of  course,  the  outstanding  payment 
obligations remained the same as before the crisis. Individual households reacted in a way they 
could. They reduced the total volume of the outstanding national home mortgage portfolio from 
$10.5 trillion in 2008 till $ 9.35 trillion as per the end of the second quarter of 2013. During the 
latter period an increased share of households’ incomes was diverted to paying off home mortgages 
as compared to the allocations before the 2008 crisis. This change in income allocation through 
paying  off  mortgage  debt  and acquiring  new homes  from own income or  savings  reduced  the 
spending power available for buying other goods and services. This had the effect that demand 
levels  were  reduced.  The  company  sector  reacted  in  slowing  down  employment  growth  and 
investments as well as generally following a wages and salary policy of keeping wage increases 
below price rises.  Reduced growth rates in companies’  turnover  levels  and a slower growth in 
households’ incomes led to a rapidly increasing government debt level in the U.S.
3.2.5 Asset allocation and interest rates (sixth tenet)
One notion that prevails in the thinking of many economists is that the price of money: its interest 
rate works in the same manner as supply and demand in the real sector. Both Marshall for micro 
economic studies and Keynes for the macro approach advocated the supply and demand theories. 
Keynes particularly stressed the importance of using monetary policy (interest rate adjustments) to 
influence the behaviour of the business sector and of the individual households.
Based on the long term data provided by the Fed on the individual households’ balance sheet plus  
some other  data,  the  Coin theory comes  to  the  conclusion  that  for  the collective  of  individual 
households interest rates are irrelevant in case the need and wish exists to restore the individual 
households’ balance sheets first. Individual households weigh the decision to borrow more against 
the income level available to support such borrowings. After the excessive home mortgage lending 
period 2003-2007 as organised by the U.S. banking sector, individual households did everything 
possible  not  to  lose  their  homes;  they  repaid  $1.15  trillion  from the  national  home  mortgage 
portfolio notwithstanding the substantially lower mortgage rates. They also funded 4 million new 
homes, not by borrowing more but by funding such acquisitions from incomes and savings. The 
latter implies a re-allocation of incomes and savings. Even in 2013 circumstantial evidence exists 
that individual households remain reluctant to increase their home mortgage levels as several U.S. 
banks have announced lay-offs in their home mortgage departments.
For the U.S. corporate sector, it has been a well documented phenomenon that from 2008 onwards 
they, until recently, did not want to borrow more either. Since 2006 non-financial companies have 
increased their cash balances from $624 billion to $1.45 trillion as per the end of 2012 according to 
Moody Investor Services12, an increase of 77%. The $1.45 trillion was 10% more than the amount 
per end of 2011. Over the period 2006-2011 the company cash to assets ratio increased from 8.8% 
in 2006 till 11% in 2011 for the non-financial companies.  The top 50 companies in the U.S owned 
12 https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-US-companies-cash-pile-grows-10-in-2012-to--PR_268757
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over 50% of all cash balances. This fact implies that the cash distribution over the many smaller 
companies was much more limited. 
All these facts point to the conclusion that, since 2006, larger companies did not react to lower 
interest rates by borrowing more but by holding more cash as compared to assets as an insurance 
against adverse economic conditions. Lower interest rates do help all companies in that short term 
existing borrowing levels will costs less when interest rates decline. From a corporate cash flow 
point of view, this is good news, but from a volume of savings point of view this is bad news as  
savings were and are kept in the financial sphere rather than being converted into real assets. The 
conclusion for the corporate sector is  that  lower interest  rates improve cash flows, but that  the 
subsequent step of converting such cash into real sector assets was not taken. Lowering the interest 
rates did not help to create a conversion boom over the period 2006-2012.
If  the  lowering  of  interest  rates  was  irrelevant  for  all  individual  households,  due  to  the  debt 
overhang and it equally did not lead to a conversion of savings into more real sector activities, why 
was so much weight (over $2 trillion to be precise) given to quantitative easing?
The links between interest rates and the users can be expanded by studying the links between the 
various asset classes and the lowering of interest rates.
To start with the deposits base: In 1985 the discount rate varied between 9 and 6% and the CPI 
inflation rate was 3.8% over the year.  In other words a strongly positive real yield for deposits 
prevailed with corporate bonds and foreign bonds at a practically negligible level. Just coming out 
of  a  recession  in  1985,  corporate  equities  were  an  important  savings  element,  but  much  less 
important than in later years. The assumption is that deposits had an attraction as a savings class as 
the other alternatives were less attractive. The facts for 1995, 2005 and 2013 change all this. In 
1995 the discount rate moved from 6-5.5%, inflation was at 2.5% and the percentage of deposits as 
compared to  total  savings  was 14.96%. In 2005 the  discount  rate  was raised from 2.25-4.25% 
during the year and inflation was running at 3.4%. Still the deposits grew practically at the same 
rate as in 1995. In 2013 the discount rate is 0.25% and inflation is running at 2.3% for this year and 
the deposits grew slightly faster than the total savings amounts over the period 2005-2013. Out of 
these  data  one  can  only  conclude  that  savings  allocated  to  deposits  have  been  interest  rate 
insensitive at least for the last 18 years.
With regards to corporate equities, neither the lowering of the discount rate to the historically low 
level of 0.25% since December 2008 nor the activity of quantitative easing has had much of an 
effect on the relative percentage of savings invested in corporate equities.  The latter  activity of 
quantitative easing basically moves more money into the financial savings side as compared to the 
use of savings for business purposes.  If  savings amounts  in corporate  equities  only stay in the 
financial  sphere,  than  the  impact  on  economic  growth  is  very  low  to  negligible.  The  afore- 
mentioned price effect is enhanced by quantitative easing. However it  is the volume effect -the 
actual transfer of funds to the real sector- which helps economies to grow. There has been no sign 
that the volume effects have taken place, rather the opposite as many large companies did hoard 
cash since the crisis of 2008. Only very recently have large businesses started to reduce such cash 
accumulations. None of these actions indicate that the lowering of interest rates had a sustained 
impact on economic growth.
For small and medium sized companies the picture is different. Borrowing rates matter. However 
the  substantial  drop  in  equity  in  non-corporate  businesses,  relative  to  the  growth  of  the  total 
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individual household’s savings portfolio, implies that SME’s have and have had a problem of equity 
generation out of retained earnings, which in itself causes banks to be more reluctant to lend.
For pension funds the savings side is linked to tax relief and company support and such savings go 
on irrespective  of  the  prevailing  interest  rate  level.  Such savings  are  based on very long term 
savings objectives and individual households do not often stop and start the build up of a pension 
pot.  The  benefit  side  is  strongly  affected  by  the  returns  earned  over  the  savings.  Especially 
important is the question if a return over inflation can be achieved. Low interest rates, especially 
long term government bond rates below inflation levels as happened in 2011 and 2012, show that 
the cost-benefit equation of saving has been artificially distorted with negative real interest rates. 
Pension funds and all other long term savers lose out, while the level of economic activities did not 
benefit.  For  pension funds,  and thereby for  all  individual  households  saving for a  pension,  the 
notion that negative real interest rates are good for economic growth has not been proven and based 
on above facts such notion can not be supported by the evidence available.
3.2.6 Funding government debt (seventh tenet)
In  section  3.2.3  surprise  was  already expressed  over  the  very  heated  deliberations  in  the  U.S. 
Houses of Congress over the government debt ceiling. This subject seems to get all the attention,  
while the breakdown of such debt over different maturities, the pricing of such debt at a fixed rate 
or at an index-linked rate and the action of the Fed to print money to buy such debt gets so little  
attention.  The U.S. parliament  is  not alone in this  respect.  It  seems to happen in various other 
countries as well.
There  are  three  reasons to  change the  borrowing behaviour  of  the  U.S.  government  and other 
governments for that matter.
1.  Index-linked government  bonds are  cheaper;  the U.S. already issues some TIPS or Treasury 
Inflation Protected Securities.
2. Index-linked bonds avoid the marked-to-market gains and losses for banks and other institutional 
holders of U.S. government bonds. 
3.  At some stage in the future the funding provided by the Fed through its  quantitative easing 
exercises will  have to be unwound. The possibility of the tapering off process has already sent 
shivers down the financial markets and has already affected the costs of funds for some emerging 
markets economies.
Why would index-linked government bonds be cheaper than fixed rate bonds? The answer to this 
question is that uncertainty over interest rate developments nearly always costs more money than 
the certainty that the main reason for moving interest rates: inflation levels is covered in the price 
investors in U.S. government bonds receive. In table 5 a historical comparison was made on the 
basis that CPI inflation level plus 1% constitutes the costs of funds for index-linked bonds and these 
costs were compared with the 10 year yield on fixed rate bonds.
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1993 6.26 2.99 3.27 3.99 2004 4.30 2.59 1.77 3.59
1994 6.90 2.56 4.34 3.56 2005 4.13 3.28 0.85 4.28
1995 6.74 2.83 3.91 3.83 2006 4.52 3.12 1.40 4.12
1996 6.07 2.95 3.12 3.95 2007 4.30 2.77 1.53 3.77
1997 6.10 2.29 3.81 3.29 2008 3.18 3.70 -0.52 4.70
1998 5.18 1.53 3.65 2.53 2009 3.16 -0.36 3.52 0.64
1999 5.64 2.16 3.48 3.16 2010 3.60 1.61 1.99 2.61
2000 5.75 3.25 2.50 4.25 2011 2.67 3.06 - 0.39 4.06
2001 5.06 2.77 2.29 3.77 2012 1.92 2.03 -0.11 3.03
2002 4.64 1.56 3.08 2.56 2013
1 July
2.50 1.67 0.83 2.67
2003 4.23 2.23 2.00 3.23
For the years 1993-2010 the Tips yield would have been substantially cheaper than the fixed rate 
bond yield, with the exception of 2005 and 2008. The 2005 margin difference is small. The 2008 
situation can easily be explained as the drop in the 10 year bond yield from 4.30% in 2007 till 
3.18% was  caused  by a  flight  to  safety  out  of  other  financial  assets  to  government  bonds.  If 
sufficient  quantities  of  index-linked  bonds  would  have  been  available,  they  would  also  have 
benefitted from this movement of savings. The situation of 2011 and 2012 can be fully explained as 
a consequence of quantitative easing.
The second reason for issuing more Tips: the valuation changes in fixed rate bonds due to the 
marked-to-market accounting practice, is linked to the maturity profile of the U.S. government debt. 
Anyone will probably agree with the statement that the U.S. and other government debt cannot be 
reduced at a speed which substantially harms the individual households in their income earning 
activities.  To repay all U.S. government debt would probably need 70 or more years.  To value 
government debt on a daily trading basis, just to suit the traders rather than the long term holders of  
such debt, while such debt needs to be rolled over anyway, does not make much sense. Tips can be 
issued for 10, 20 or more years and the marked-to-market will remain the same over the whole 
investment period: CPI inflation rate plus 1%.
The third reason is linked to the practice of quantitative easing. Of course the Fed’s objective was to 
influence the availability and cost of money and credit when it undertook to buy some $2 trillion of 
government and other securities. The cost of money was duly affected as the 10 year yield on U.S 
fixed rate treasuries dropped from 4.3% in 2007 till 1.92% in 2012. This happened during the same 
period that the U.S government increased its debt level from $9 trillion in 2007 to $16 trillion in 
2012. Once the Fed decides to reduce its interventions or even reverse its past purchases, interest 
rates over fixed rate bonds will go up. To avoid huge losses on existing portfolios for all kind of 
bond holders, i.e. banks, pension funds, life insurance companies and others, the issuance of all new 
and  replacement  bonds  could  be  made  in  Tips.  One  might  even consider  swapping  the  whole 
portfolio of U.S. treasuries held by the Fed into Tips. As and when market circumstances permit 
such Tips could be released back to the financial markets.
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3.2.7 Corrective measures (eighth tenet)
The reason that corrective measures were and are necessary after the 2008 financial crisis is that the 
adjustment period has taken the longest time -apart from the Great Depression period- in nearly 100 
years. The key element of the Coin economic theory is that the changes in the financial savings of 
the collective of individual households are unequal to the funds received by the real business sector. 
Such assessment could not have been made at the time of Adam Smith; the financial markets as we 
know them now, did not exist. At the times of Keynes, there were financial markets, especially the 
stock market, but not as developed with all the bells and whistles as there are currently. The trading 
and the gambling elements have multiplied over the years and making money in the financial sector 
out of financial  transactions has become a habit  of the rich,  sometimes to the detriment  of the 
masses. Also the institutionalisation of savings through pension funds, mutual funds and the equity 
and government bond markets and the substantial growth in the derivatives markets were elements 
that did not exist at the times of Keynes. Last but not least, the evidence as provided through the 
exceptionally well documented statistics, as the Fed has been providing in the form of the Balance 
Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations, did not exist during Keynes times. It would not 
have been possible to state that the financial multiplier: the amount of savings which were used to 
enhance production was different from the savings level which stayed behind in the financial sector. 
Currently one can work out quite accurately the amount of savings which stayed behind in the 
financial sector.
The 2008 financial crisis was caused by the U.S. banking sector originating home mortgages with a 
speed that far exceeded the income growth of individual households. It was also caused by changing 
the  U.S.  national  home  mortgage  portfolio  with  adding  a  substantial  number  of  individual 
borrowers to the national mortgage portfolio who had poor outlooks for repaying the out standing 
mortgage - the sub-prime segment.  Thirdly the crisis was spread around the world through the 
mortgage backed securities markets and the credit derivatives based upon them.
The collective of individual households reacted by aiming to restore their own balance sheets. They 
repaid $1.15 trillion on the national home mortgage portfolio over the period 2008-30 June 2013 or 
nearly 11% of the 2008 outstanding amount. They also paid for the construction of over 4 million 
new homes over the period 2008 till to-day out of their own incomes and savings. Both actions 
reduced the amounts available for other consumption. 
The  reduced  demand  for  goods  and  services  produced  by  the  real  sector  led  to  higher 
unemployment  rates;  higher  company failures  levels,  especially  of the SME type;  lower labour 
force participation rates; income growth below inflation levels and more part-time new jobs. It also 
led to an increase in U.S. government debt from $9 trillion in 2007 till $16 trillion to-day, a 78% 
increase  over  5 1/2 years.  If  Keynes  would have been alive  to-day,  he would have been most 
impressed with this  kind of fiscal  stimulus.  Keynes  would probably also have approved of the 
lowering of interest rates through quantitative easing.
What Keynes did not consider was that increased funding of government debt levels uses savings to 
stay in the financial sector, rather than being used by the real business sector. What he also did not 
consider was that the evidence of lowering interest rates to stimulate investments by the real sector 
has been sketchy to say the least. Companies, large and small, do not produce more, just for the  
sake  of  production.  They  do produce  if  they  see  a  chance  to  sell  their  products.  The  general 
equilibrium can be restored,  but  only if  individual  households get  some help in  restoring their 
personal balance sheets.
22
Over the last 5 years, the U.S. government has spent $7 trillion in additional spending over tax 
receipts and another $2 trillion to lower the interest rates or about $ 57,000 per every household. 
Such action would all be in line with Keynes theories, but the effects of it have been painfully slow. 
The main reason is that none of these measures were aimed to improve the personal balance sheets 
of individual households. A possible alternative, which only partially involves the government, is 
economic easing. This alternative allows individual households to access a small part of their own 
savings from their pension pots for a short period of time. Such a transfer from the financial sector 
to the real sector creates a demand pull incentive from the individual households without affecting 
their level of indebtedness. In section 4, economic easing will be fully explained.
Other measures,  which may be taken, are a “traffic light system” to the banking system, when 
mortgage lending exceeds the average income growth of households. Another possible measure is 
to make bankers stick to their considered opinions from the day of lending.
Still another possible measure is to give Small and Medium sized companies a chance to build up 
their equity base, through retained earnings. Such retained earnings could be taxed at a zero or low 
corporate tax rate, until full employment has been reached: a so-called “flexi-tax”. This will make 
SME’s more creditworthy with lower risks for the banking sector.
All these possible measure will be set out in section 4.
3.2.8. Costs benefits structures for the financial sector companies (ninth tenet)
The current drive to make banks safer companies is not based on what bankers do, but on avoiding 
another government bail-out for banks which are too big to fail.  Higher equity ratios for banks 
expose the collective of individual households to higher risks, just in the same way as individual 
households have ultimately to pay for bank bail-outs by governments. 
It is a mistake to think that bankers individually cause all the mishaps in an economy. Just as in the 
case of the collective of individual households, the collective of individual banks make the wrong 
decisions at times. There are discussions going on about establishing macro-prudential rules and 
hopefully these discussions lead to rules that affect the collective of individual banks, rather than 
just one or a few banks.
Banks plus all  the other financial  sector  companies  are different  from the business sector.  The 
financial sector companies combined allocate the financial savings of the collective of individual 
households over the various asset classes. Their “profits” are based on totally different principles 
than those for the business sector. As all the fines for miss-selling financial products show and as all 
the losses on mortgage backed securities show, mistakes  from the past have come to haunt the 
banks years after their products were sold. The declared profits in the past were misleading to say 
the least.
It is for this reason that a “light touch” or laissez faire attitude to financial  sector companies is 
inappropriate. Competition between financial sector companies does not mean the same as in the 
business  sector.  The “prices”  charged by the financial  sector  bear  no resemblance  to  the  price 
setting and competition in the business sector. The collective of individual households is not well 
protected  against  the failures  of banks and other  financial  sector  companies.  Of course deposit 
insurance helps, but if one really thinks about it, it takes away the risks for placing deposits with 
any particular bank, but in case of bank failures the losses are still losses to the financial savings of 
the collective of individual households. Risks have only been moved around.
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It is for this very reason that, in the past, I proposed a different method to fund banks: a cash flow 
based  method  combined  with  a  bankers’  decision  method  which  does  not  allow for  “changed 
opinions”. Such a method will be explained in section 4. Such a method would serve the collective 
of individual households -the ultimate fund providers- best rather than the bankers
4. Possible adjustment measures
In this section the following possible adjustment measures will be suggested:
• Economic easing
• Flexi-tax for SME’s
• A “traffic light” system for home mortgages
• A “traffic light” system for margin lending for share purchases
• A financial sector restructuring plan based on the interests of the collective of individual 
households.
4.1 Economic easing
Towers Watson in their global pension assets study13 have identified the following five countries, 
excluding Japan, with the highest level of pension assets in 2012. The U.S. has $16.8 trillion in 
pension assets, the U.K. has the equivalent of $2.7 trillion; Australia has U.S. $1.56 trillion; Canada 
has  U.S.  $1.48 trillion  and The Netherlands  has  $1.2 trillion.  The pension assets  of  these  five 
countries combined represent about 80% of the world’s pension assets in 2012.
These pension assets are a major part of the financial assets of the individual households in their 
respective countries. 
Pension  savings  are  influenced  by  the  same  characteristics  as  all  financial  assets.  Economic 
uncertainties play the key role in assessing the future values of the assets.  Life expectancy changes 
play the most important role on the liabilities side. If bankers and the credit rating agencies cannot 
predict loan or bond losses as the past experience has shown, than pension funds have an equally 
difficult task to predict the future values of their asset base. All attempts to do so are bound to fail. 
The result is a Considered Opinion, just as valid as those of bankers, asset managers and others in 
the financial sector.
Economic easing has as aim to focus on the individual household’s income position in a direct  
manner. Its objective is to support individual households in overcoming their income shortfall when 
no home mortgage volume controls are in place and the country is in a recession or slow growth 
phase. U.S. individual households have accumulated nearly $17 trillion in savings for the purpose 
of having an income stream available during their retirement years. The future asset values of such 
savings are strongly influenced by current economic performance. Current economic performance is 




services,  rather  than having to service home mortgage  loans at  an excessively fast  pace out of 
reduced income levels as compared to CPI inflation levels. For this reason economic easing can act 
as an economic stabiliser.
The U.S. pension funds could collectively be requested to pay out, say 2% of their asset value. This 
would mean an income cash injection for individual households of about $330 billion per annum till 
the economy has fully recovered. Such request needs to be accompanied by a shortfall guarantee 
from the U.S. government so that pension funds after the pay out would be in no worse position 
than before the pay out. The increase in households’ incomes will bring about an increased demand 
for goods and services, especially when Americans will be asked to spend the additional income 
rather than save the amounts in a “Help the Economy” campaign.
Such  cash  transfer  to  individual  households  would  represent  a  2.4%  increase  in  their  annual 
personal income levels. If such payments are made tax free, made in equal amounts to all pension 
savers and retired pension beneficiaries and spread over four quarterly instalments, the maximum 
impact on economic growth would be achieved. 
Companies will benefit, job creation will benefit, government tax incomes will benefit, individual 
households will benefit without increasing their outstanding loan volumes and finally the financial 
sector  savings  will  benefit  with  higher  share  prices  based  on  a  better  outlook  for  company 
performance and lower home mortgage loan losses as more individual households are able to repay 
outstanding loans according to the agreed maturity  schedules.  House prices  will  also avoid the 
dramatic dips in home values.
To  make  economic  easing  a  success  only  a  full  co-operation  between  a  government  and  the 
collective of all pension fund companies will suffice. The shortfall guarantee could be exercised 
after  a  period  of  say  three  years  and  the  amounts  would  only  cover  the  paid  out  amounts  to 
individual  households  plus  the  yields  over  these  amounts  based  on  the  prevailing  10  year 
government bond rates. It is suggested that the potential government pay-outs will be reduced by 
the gains the pension funds have made over their shares investments from the date of the first pay-
out.
The reason to pay all pension savers and retirees an equal amount is that the younger generation 
will have to save for a much longer period -with all the investment risks attached to it- than those 
closer to retirement or already in retirement.
Economic easing avoids the sharp increase in government budget deficits; it avoids the need for 
quantitative easing; it avoids the very costly adjustments to the capacity utilisation rate of the real 
sector  and  it  avoids  the  dramatic  increases  in  unemployment  rates.  It  does  not  save  poorly 
performing banks, but it counteracts the effects of the explosive growth in home mortgages far in 
excess of the income growth speed. Economic easing will also result in companies having to spend 
less  on maintaining  their  contributions  to  their  defined benefit  schemes.  It  will  also mean that 
individuals will be incentivised to join DB or DC pension schemes as only those saving for a future 
pension will benefit from the temporary pay-outs.
If one compares the potential costs of economic easing with the amounts of fiscal stimulus plus 
quantitative easing of $9 trillion, which the U.S. government has already spent, it is striking how 
small the costs are: $330 billion in year one, minus the appreciation values of the share portfolios. It 
should come as no surprise as economic easing is a policy method directly aimed to correct the 
imbalance  in  individual  households’  balance  sheets.  The  reason  for  it  is  that  it  addresses  the 
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problems of the income shortfalls of the collective of individual households in a direct manner, 
rather than indirectly. On top of this, both the use of government deficits and of quantitative easing 
creates financial assets rather than income. It is the extra income which the collective of individual 
households need in order to restore demand levels.
4.2 The flexi-tax
Small  and medium sized enterprises  are at  a disadvantaged position as compared to the largest 
companies in the U.S. and in other countries. They usually have no access to the equity capital 
markets because of their size. However as stated above, such SME’s are main providers of job 
opportunities. During recession periods such SME companies suffer more in that cost cutting for 
them is less effective with the smaller numbers employed as compared to the larger companies. 
SME’s also do not have the option to ask the equity capital markets for more funds. It is therefore 
advisable to introduce the flexi-tax. The flexi-tax is the corporate tax rate levied on SME’s. If the 
tax rate for SME’s is lowered as compared to the big companies, than SME’s have a better chance 
to grow through retaining their corporate profits. Such flexi-tax rate should only be applied when a 
country needs job creation and economic growth. Once both are back to satisfactory levels,  the 
advantage of the flexi-tax could be withdrawn and standard corporate tax rates will, once again 
become the norm.
4.3 A “traffic light system” for home mortgages
It matters whether a standard variable rate interest rate structure is sold compared to a 30 year fixed 
rate  structure.  It  matters  whether  there is  a  repayment  plan  or  an interest  only plan.  It  matters 
whether the income of the borrower is checked by outside sources or provided by the borrower 
himself. It matters whether there is a 100% financing of the home, or even more, or whether the 
mortgagee has to take an equity share in the property himself. It matters whether the interest rate 
structure is skewed towards higher future interest payments rather than starting up with the long 
term rate.  The quality  of  the  national  home mortgage  portfolio  changes  through each  of  these 
products. What is important is not to try to micro manage each and every decision by banks in their 
mortgage  offers,  but  to  have  the  powers  to  intervene  if  such  mortgage  offers  substantially 
undermine the overall quality of the national home mortgage portfolio. This could be part of a new 
management structure for the national home mortgage portfolio.
In case the sales efforts  of home mortgages  are too “successful”,  or in other words exceed the 
income growth capacity of individual households, a traffic light system could be introduced by the 
Fed. Green should stand for please continue,  amber  for slow down and red for a  cash penalty 
system  for  all  banks  and  intermediaries,  including  investment  banks,  which  continue  to  sell 
mortgage risks either to individual households or to the financial markets. If the penalties are set 
high enough, it will force through the message that the national home mortgage portfolio needs 
managing and restraint is needed. The interest rate applied to home mortgage borrowers does not 
change; it is the charge to the sellers of such mortgages which changes.
4.4 A “traffic light system” for margin trading and short selling practices
Irrational exuberance is a common phenomenon in the equity markets in the U.S. but also in other 
countries. It has already led to several economic recessions. The most dangerous practice from an 
economic growth point of view is that the financial sector takes risks on equities through margin 
trading or short  selling which expose the whole stock market  to a possible  down turn.  Margin 
trading was the initial cause of the 1929 Great Depression. What it means is that there is no level 
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playing field between those market participants, who pay for their shares in full and for those who 
bet with a small percentage of the sum on the equity price developments.
Again, just as in the case of home mortgages, the aim should not be to micro-manage the financial 
markets  intermediaries,  but  to  have  a  “traffic  light  system”  installed  to  slow  down  or  even 
temporarily stop the practice if there are dangers to the whole economic fabric of the U.S. The 
potential penalties should not be levied on the gamblers, but on the financial intermediaries that 
facilitate the gambling. The same could be applied to short selling practices. Again the fines system 
should not be applied to the short sellers, but to the financial institutions that make short selling 
possible.
4.5 A financial sector restructuring plan which puts individual households first.
In the U.S., banks have already undergone rigorous tests to ensure that they have the capacity to 
absorb any foreseeable future event. However the question may be raised if the current bank equity 
based  structure  is  the  most  efficient  method  for  sharing  risks  and  income  between  the  bank 
management and staff, the owners and the other fund providers.
Banks are different from any other company in that their  assets and liabilities are monies only. 
Their activities are all related to money products, such as lending, trading currencies, trading in 
interest rates and providing other money services. 
The art of risk taking implies that banks are able to predict a future outcome for their loans, for their 
currency and interest  rate  positions  and for their  stock and bond markets  listings,  mergers  and 
acquisitions actions and corporate or government advisory activities and finally for their trading for 
own account.
Two elements set banks apart from ordinary companies. Firstly banks are the originators of debt for 
businesses and individual households. The decision to lend is solely a decision taken by the banks. 
In lending to businesses, banks try to protect themselves from other banks adding more debt to the 
same business. In lending to individual households the market is a free for all.  Secondly banks 
assume from the outset that they have made the right decisions, in other words there will be no loan 
losses or losses to other market participants from their lending, M&A and stock market listings, for 
instance.
Banks and the regulators use the Value at Risk (VaR) approach, which is supposed to predict the 
outcome of  the  decisions  by the  bankers  with  some degree  of  certainty.  Volatility,  worst  case 
scenarios, maximum loss assessments are based on time periods, confidence level and potential loss 
amounts. To give some scant confidence to the markets, one of the VaR assessment methods, which 
is used, is called the Monte Carlo simulation, hence the term casino banking.
“True” risk taking is based on foresight, rather than on adjustable versions which can be changed on 
a daily basis depending on how economic and political factors change. In hindsight it has been clear 
that  the  collective  of  banks  in  a  number  of  countries  created  a  lending  boom  to  individual 
households  which  was  far  in  excess  of  the  average  income  growth  of  these  households.  VaR 
assessments  are made by individual  banks,  not by the collective of banks jointly.  However the 
current economic problems were caused by the collective of banks, including the investment banks.
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A way to solve this dilemma between individual and collective actions is to force individual banks 
to set their “foresight” in stone. This can be done by allowing banks to deduct from their profit 
levels an amount of “loss provision” for every loan or other activity at the moment the loan or other  
agreement is signed. In effect the VaR is assessed at the moment of taking the risk and cannot be 
changed later. No excuses for wrong assessments. 
If such VaR assessments are made tax deductible also from the day the loan or other agreement is 
entered into and cannot be changed over the lifetime of the loan or contract, the skills of individual 
banks and their bankers in predicting future outcomes will be reflected in the profit levels made. If 
banks make mistakes by underestimating VaR requirements, than such mistakes would no longer be 
tax deductable; they would have to be funded from the accumulated level of deferred staff bonuses 
and from a write down in the value of shareholders equity. If banks had been too conservative, a 
freefall of the excess VaR amounts would not be taxed and could be paid to shareholders and to the 
bankers who took the decisions in the past.
This  leads  to  the  concept  of  “shareholders”  in  a  bank.  Banks  are  income  and  expense  based 
institutions, whereby incomes and expenses have all to come from financial assets and liabilities. 
Such  liabilities  include  the  “risk”  taking  category  of  shareholders.  Banks  are  cash-flow based 
institutions and the individual households -or their representatives in the form of pension funds and 
mutual funds- should get priority over bankers’ pay. Their value at risk is the amount of money 
provided to a bank in order to take the risks banks take. The best way to achieve such priority is to  
turn share capital into non-redeemable perpetual notes which pay out an annual fixed rate of return. 
Such notes  could  be  stock market  listed  and the  price  of  such notes  would  reflect  the  market 
perception of the skills of the bankers. Around par or slightly above indicates a well-managed bank. 
A steep discount to par reflects poor bankers’ judgments. More perpetual notes will be needed to 
overcome the unforeseen losses and the price for getting such risk capital will need to go up. All  
regulators need to do is to ensure that banks cannot expand unless their latest perpetual notes issues 
are quoted at around par. Investment banks should be forced to make the same VaR arrangements 
for  their  stock  market  introductions  and  mergers  and  acquisition  activities.  They  make  risk 
assessments that can affect the money put out at  risk by individual households. They -just like 
commercial  bankers-  should  be  held  responsible  for  their  advice  to  the  markets,  in  that  they 
guarantee -over a declining time scale- that their judgments are correct. If not they will need to buy 
back part of the issued stock for instance. 
Individually banks make judgments which often affect all banks, but also all fund providers, the 
individual households. A reform of the banking system which recognises the fact that all  funds 
banks have at their disposal originate from the collective of individual households, will lead to a 
different  bank  reform  programme  than  is  currently  under  consideration  through  the  Basel  III 
agreements.
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